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Abstract   Wastewater management is a complex task involving a wide range of 
technical enviromental and social factors. Furthermore, it typically requires the 
coordination of a heterogeneous society of actors with different goals. Regulations 
and protocols can be effectively used to tackle this complexity. In this chapter we 
present a norm-aware multi-agent system for social simulations in a river basin. The 
norms we present are inspired in European policies for wastewater management and 
they can evolve through time. 
1 Introduction 
 In this chapter we will study the effect of regulations in the administration of 
wastewater fluxes in a river basin. Wastewater management is a difficult task, 
requiring the simultaneous consideration of a wide range of factors: technical, 
environmental, economical, social, legal, etc. When applied to a scenario such as a 
river basin, wastewater management requires to coordinate a wide range of 
activities performed by a society of actors with different goals (sometimes not 
aligned with the holistic goal of the society). The combination of these factors 
results in the fact that wastewater management in river basin is a complex process. 
One of such scenarios, for instance, involve the well-known dilemma of the 
Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968), where rational agents use fresh water as 
part of their operations thus generating wastewater. Left alone, these agents would 
overpass wastewater treatment plants capacity until river gets too polluted and, 
hence, no longer usable by anybody. 
Regulations and protocols are one of the possible solutions we can apply to tame 
complexity. However, due to the implicit complexity of the scenario it is hard for 
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policy makers to tailor the exact set of regulations that will govern the system. On 
the one hand, several interacting factors have to be taken into account when 
designing the regulations. On the other hand, such regulations cannot be tested in 
real scenarios due to the cost of their application and its environmental implications. 
We present a norm-aware multi-agent system (MAS) for social simulations in a 
river basin. Our system allows studying the effect of regulations in the behaviour of 
the different actors involved in a scenario based on the Tragedy of the Commons, as 
well as analysing different agents’ behaviours under such scenario. The idea is 
using a norm-aware simulator where policies encourage the alignment of agents’ 
behaviour to the common objective of the system, effectively detecting and 
sanctioning free-raiders and misbehaving actors, thus trying to prevent the Tragedy. 
The policies we present are inspired in European policies for wastewater 
management practice. Furthermore, policies in our system can evolve through time 
as a result of agents’ behaviour and adapt to unexpected situations such as heavy 
rains or river pollution. Information technologies applied to environmental issues 
show potential in a wide range of fields, among others, decision support systems 
(Poch et al. 2004) and simulations (Hamilton 1969). However, the complexity of 
environmental problems introduces several challenges that information 
technologies should tackle. The first one is the fact that environmental issues must 
be considered in terms of complex systems, mainly due to the amount of variables 
to be considered and their dependencies. Also the high degree of uncertainty 
associated to the system and the potential impact (and therefore, risk) of the 
decisions taken w.r.t. these systems. The second issue is the fact that, in 
environmental systems, the scenario should often reflect conflicting goals, and we 
need to take into account a set of heterogeneous (sometimes conflicting) views and 
perspectives. These complex scenarios, where a wide variety of actors with 
different (sometimes conflicting) goals interact between them, can benefit from 
norm-aware electronic distributed systems based on agent technologies. Such 
systems can ensure compliance with the different actors to the expected behaviours 
and environmental policies, where environmental policies are designed to guide the 
overall system to a common higher goal, such as the preservation of the 
environment while keeping an active economy. 
Our proposal is a norm-aware agent-based model for integrated Wastewater 
Management Systems. We apply this to the Besòs River Basin. The idea of using 
Autonomous Agents to cope with the problem has been done in view of the various, 
sometimes conflicting, goals that the identified actors have to fulfil their private 
interests. In this scenario each actor requires its own system view with customized 
privileges and access to differing control tools, either managerial or operational.  
The system proposed aims at managing the treatment capabilities of Wastewater 
Treatment Plants (WWTPs), allowing coordination among them and with the 
different actors in the scenario. Plants treat wastewater coming from various 
sources before discharging it to the river, treated and with the appropriate ecologic 
conditions. To ensure river’s ecological quality, water sensors measuring different 
parameters (e.g., temperature, acidity, suspended solids on water, river oxygen 
demand, etc.) are located along the river in interesting points, such as water 
discharge points for WWTPs. Plants are connected to various elements providing 
wastewater with different characteristics, including: towns providing household 
wastewater with a steady flow of quantity and variable pollutant concentrations; 
rain retaining tanks providing lightly polluted meteo wastewater, which comes in 
very high quantities during short periods of time; industries providing industrial 
wastewater with high variability both in quantity and pollutant concentrations. 
Some of the elements (e.g., towns) are connected directly to the plant, effectively 
providing a steady flow of wastewater. Some elements have a retainer tank between 
the wastewater source and the plant ( e.g., meteorological wastewater). Finally, 
some elements present both options, they can discharge wastewater directly to the 
plant or store it on a retention tank (e.g., industries). The different elements are 
connected using pipes that form a sewage network. Some points in the network 
(e.g., where industrial wastewater is mixed with household wastewater) might be 
observed by sewage inspectors. Finally, a competent authority oversees the whole 
system taking decisions to ensure both the ecological quality of the water and the 
economic sustainability of the society. 
Our agent-based model is built on top of the ALIVE (Aldewereld et al. 2010) 
framework. This Chapter focuses on the specification of ALIVE’s organisational 
model, putting special emphasis on the norms and how they evolve due to 
organisational, technological, social and contextual changes. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the process 
followed, and the case study. It is an urban wastewater system inspired on the actual 
Besós river basin which is fully described in Section 2.1. In Section 3 we introduce 
the Tragedy of the Commons. Section 4 explores the objectives, roles and social 
structure of the system with the communication links. In Section 5 we introduce the 
basis and elements for the decision making from a wastewater management 
perspective. Later, Section 6 introduces the norms governing the system and 
provides examples of how they can evolve dynamically. Finally, Section 7, presents 
a discussion and the main conclusions of this chapter. 
2 Methodology 
In the ALIVE organizational model roles are the central concept. Roles identify the 
activities necessary to achieve organizational objectives and enable abstraction 
from the specific actors that perform them (Dignum and Dignum 2009). Based on 
these conceptualizations, the modelling process follows an iterative application of 
the following steps:  
 identify the stakeholders in the system  
 formally define the roles, identifying their goals and their dependencies  
 model the interaction scenes between roles. Scenes are used to manage role 
dependencies via interaction protocols  
 organize the scenes into a coherent interaction structure  
 identify the way agents will enact roles at run-time.  
All this process is supported by the OperettA Tool (Aldewereld and Dignum 2010), 
this is one of the results of the ALIVE FP7 funded project (Vázquez-Salceda et al. 
2010). 
2.1 Schema of wastewater flows in the case study 
The case study is a River Basin composed by elements generating both wastewater 
(a set of households K],[ 1 k   and a set of industries I],[ 1 iII  ) and 
polluted water (meteorological events that generate runoff). For simplicity we will 
consider both wastewater and polluted water to be wastewater. There are also 
elements storing wastewater (a set of retention tanks T],[ 1 lTT  ), treating 
wastewater (a set of Urban Wastewater Treatment Plants W],[ 1 jWW  ), and 
receiving waters (e.g. a River). 
Also, there is a graph Sis  that represents the sewerage infrastructure in a 
urban sector or city. It encompasses components such as receiving drains, 
manholes, pumping stations, storm overflows, and screening chambers of the 
combined sewer or sanitary sewer. is  ends at the entry to a jW . In turn every jW  
is connected with the receiving waters. In our model as in many European countries 
all elements in K  and I  are obliged to connect their sanitation and/or wastewater 
discharge to is  where possible. 
The wastewater is characterized by the flow (or volume) and the pollutant 
concentrations of: Total Suspended Solids ( TSS ), Biochemical Oxygen Demand (
BOD ), Chemical Oxygen Demand ( COD ), Total Nitrogen ( TN ) and Total 
Phosphorus ( TP ), which are defined as the set of pollutants rx  with (
TPTNCODDBOTSS ,,,, ) = ( 1x , 2x , 3x , 4x , 5x ) (Verdaguer et al. 2012). All 
concentrations related to these pollutants are indicated with a supra-index r , with 
r =1, , 5. For subsequent paragraphs, this specification is not repeated in the 
text in order to avoid many repetitions. 
The household generates a wastewater mass MDM  with a particular volume 
DD VMvolume =)( , and a concentration for each pollutant OjO  
j
DjD COMionconcentrat =),( , which is discharged in a plant WkW . 
Analogously, the runoffs retention tank has a wastewater mass stored MMM  
with volume MM LMvolume =)(  and pollutant concentration 
j
MjM COMionconcentrat =),( . The tanks has a volumetric discharge to kW  and 
feasible volumetric bypass to receiving waters when the retention tank has an 
overflow. It means the tank can bypass a water mass MDMM  with a volume 
DMDM VMvolume =)( . These two discharge possibilities allow adapting the sewer 
performance of separative or combined run-off collection. Each industrial activity 
has its own retention tank, with a water mass MiM  with volume 
ii LMvolume =)(  and pollutant concentration 
j
iji COMionconcentrat =),( . Its 
volumetric discharge to the treatment is ii VMvolume =)( . The plant kW  is 
capable of accepting a water mass as influent MTM  with volume 
TT VMvolume =)(  and pollutant concentration 
j
TjT COMionconcentrat =),( . It 
provides a water mass as effluent MeM  with volume ee VMvolume =)(  and 
pollutant concentration 
j
eje COMionconcentrat =),(  to receiving waters. 
Additionally, the treatment has the possibility to bypass wastewater. The bypass 
consists in a water mass MbM  with volume bb VMvolume =)(  and pollutant 
concentration 
j
bjb COMionconcentrat =),( . The upstream provides a water mass 
MUM  with volume )=( UU VMvolume  and pollutant concentration 
j
UjU COMionconcentrat =),(  to receiving waters. The receiving waters correspond 
to a section of river basin, which has a water mass MRWM  with volume 
RWRW VMvolume =)(  and pollutant concentration 
j
RWjRW COMionconcentrat =),(  
3 Tragedy of the Commons  
The Tragedy of the Commons was described by Hardin (Hardin 1968), inspired by 
the lectures of Lloyd (Lloyd 1833) about population growth. The Tragedy is a 
situation where a set of appropriators consume a common good - or common-pool 
resource (CPR). These appropriators have incentives towards an over development 
or excessive exploitation of the common good, thus leading to depleting it. The 
basis of these incentives lays on the fact that increasing their consumption capacity 
brings them a direct benefit, while the cost of that increment is divided among all 
appropriators, thus the option of augmenting consumption capacity always 
beneficial. Assuming all agents are rational, everybody will. Hardin noticed that 
this problem cannot be solved by means of technical solutions, since it requires a 
change in the values and morality of people. That is why Hardin coined this as a 
Tragedy, not as in its common meaning of drama work, but as how the own 
rationality of agents lead to an inexorable fatal destiny. However, this is not 
necessarily what occur in this kind of scenarios. 
Ostrom (Ostrom et al. 1994) presents a list of cases were the tragedy is avoided 
and highlights the case of how a South California basin area was heading to an 
overexploited scenario and how an institutional arrangement - by means of an 
equity court system and establishing special districts - to use basins allowed to not 
only prevent the tragedy, but ensured water availability even in significant drought 
periods. Hardin, then reviewed his position and clarified that the Tragedy occurs 
mainly in unmanaged commons (Hardin 2007). Ostrom also showed criticism 
towards solutions to manage CPR by means of central government institutions, that 
are far away from the local people who has to deal with the common good. 
According to her, the results are always suboptimal and temporary, since they are 
usually based on coercive measures and, if they are not accompanied of monitoring 
and sanction capabilities, instead of avoiding the tragedy, it is even fostered. 
Ostrom prefers self-organised institutions who devise its own rules, since it seems 
to be a common factor on long-live surviving CPR (Ostrom 1990) (Ostrom 1999). 
Ostrom defines a CPR facility as an element which provides the conditions to 
sustain a stock of resource units. This stock produces a flow of resource units over 
time that can be appropriated (and diminished) as it is consumed (Ostrom et al. 
1994). For instance, a fishing grounds and tons of fish, a windmill field and 
electricity. If the common good is renewable, it is possible to define a regeneration 
rate. While the amount of appropriated units does not exceed this regeneration rate, 
the CPR will be sustainable. If the common good is an exhaustible resource - no 
regeneration rate - or the appropriation exceeds the regeneration rate, the common 
goods will be eventually depleted. 
With this representation of CPR, Ostrom also proposes to distinguish the 
problems of a CPR situation into two types (Ostrom et al. 1994): appropriation and 
provision problems. Each of them also poses additional sub-problems. 
Appropriation problems refer to the development of rules to manage common 
good consumption: excluding potential beneficiaries and resource allocation from 
the resource flow produced by the CPR stocks - the main concern of this kind of 
problems is the flow of common good. In this kind of problems it is assumed that 
the relation between the yield provided by the CPR and the required inputs to obtain 
that yield, is given (see Fig. 1). 
 Fig. 1. A framework for provision problems (Ostrom et al. 1994) 
  
Fig. 2. A framework for appropriation problems (Ostrom et al. 1994) 
Provision problems refer to the development of rules to manage contributions to: 
creating a resource, maintaining or improving its production capabilities and/or 
avoiding its destruction - the main concern of provision problems is the CPR stocks 
(see Fig. 2). 
3.1 Designing institutions for CPR 
Institutions, understood as a set of agreed conventions on a community of agents, is 
relevant in the way common goods are managed. The rules that agents create or are 
imposed by external agencies, drive how appropriators interact with the common 
good which is a key factor on ensuring its sustainability. 
Humans relate and interact with other people according to conventions or rules 
that have emerged from communities and society. All human societies devise 
constraints to structure and regulate the relationship between its members 
(Vázquez-Salceda 2003). Institutions are distinguishable by the set of constraints 
that govern these relations. 
North studied the effect of institutions (which he considers a set of constraints) 
on the behaviour of human organizations. He points out that these institutional 
constraints ease the interaction among humans, shaping choices and making 
outcomes predictable (North 1990). The devising of these constraints allows for a 
growth on the complexity of the organizations while keeping interaction costs 
reduced, and similarly, allows the participants of the institution to act, and expect 
other participant to act according to a list of rights, duties, and protocols of 
interaction. 
For this reason, the creation of Institutions provides trust among parties even 
when they do not have much information about each other. In environments with 
incomplete information, cooperative interactions can perform ineffectively unless 
there are institutions which provide sufficient information for all the individuals to 
create trust and to control deviations. 
Institutions can be classified according to how they are created and maintained, 
or on the formality of its rules. On the former case, Institutions can be created from 
scratch and remain static or be continuously evolving. On the latter, institutions can 
be informal, that is, defined by informal constraints such as social conventions and 
codes of behaviour, or formal, defined by formal rules. Those can be political and 
legal rules, economic laws, or contracts. 
In formal institutions the purpose of formal rules is to promote certain kinds of 
exchange while raising the cost of undesired kinds of exchange. Ostrom (Ostrom 
1999) classifies formal rules in 7 types: 
1. boundary rules affect the characteristics of the participants,  
2. position rules differentially affect the capabilities and responsibilities of those in 
positions,  
3. authority rules affect the actions that participants in positions may, must or must 
not do,  
4. scope rules affect the outcomes that are allowed, mandated or forbidden,  
5. aggregation rules affect how individual actions are transformed into final 
outcomes,  
6. information rules affect the kind of information present or absent in a situation,  
7. pay-off rules affect assigned costs and benefits to actions and outcomes.  
As norms are the elements that characterize institutions, they do not only serve as 
norms to be followed, but also serve as indication for people to recognize an 
organization as being an instance of a particular kind of institution, and then use this 
knowledge to predict other norms that could be applicable. 
4 Wastewater Systems’ Organizational Model 
Agent based systems (Wooldridge and Jennings 1995) are an alternative for 
designing and implementing open and dynamic systems. As defined by Wooldridge 
& Jennings: An agent is an encapsulated computer system that is situated in some 
environment and that is capable of flexible, autonomous action in that environment 
in order to meet its design objectives. Agents are capable of social behaviour, they 
can communicate, compete and cooperate among them. 
The main idea behind a society is to allow its members to coexist in a shared 
environment and pursue their respective goals in cooperation or competition with 
others. Therefore, artificial social systems (Moses and Tennenholtz 1995) define an 
abstract social level over computational systems. The social level models the MAS 
as an organization of entities, defining structured patterns of behaviour that 
facilitate and enhance the coordination of agent activities (Vázquez-Salceda 2003), 
effectively providing an Organizational Model agent’s can understand and use. We 
will use a Institution as the ones described in Section 3 to model agent’s interaction 
in the Besòs River Basin. 
This section briefly introduces the Organizational Model of our scenario, 
including the Social Structure (with roles and their relationships) the Interaction 
Structure (with the Landmarks, patterns of interaction by which agents coordinate 
their behaviour) and the Social model (mapping abstract roles to particular agents). 
For a in-depth discussion see (Gómez-Sebastià 2016). 
4.1 Social Structure 
ALIVE Social Structure allows the description of the roles and their relationships, 
connecting them with both the individual goals and the societal aims. In our 
proposal the global aim of the wastewater systems’ organizational structure is to 
achieve an effluent with characteristics adequate to the quality requirements of 
receiving waters. The roles model the distribution of responsibilities among 
stakeholders and their dependencies. Fig. 3 shows the set of roles and their 
associated objectives and sub-objectives. For the sake of brevity we will not explain 
all of them but the most relevant. Role dependencies come in three wastewater, 
hierarchically dependencies (where the parent role has some form of authority over 
the child role, and therefore when the parent role requests the child role to perform a 
task, the child role is expected to abide), which are indicated with H  in Fig. 3, 
network dependencies (where roles coordinate themselves as peers by mutual 
interest and support each other to fulfil a common goal) and market dependencies 
(where there is a set of producer roles offering information and/or services to 
consumer roles for a given price), which are indicated with a M  in Fig. 3. 
Also in Fig. 3 External Ex  and Internal In  roles are shown. Internal roles are 
controlled by the organization. Typically, if they are software components it means 
the organization has access to the software source code and is able to control and 
verify it. External roles are those participating in the organization, but not 
controlled by it. Following the same example, in the case of software components it 
means they have not been necessarily developed by the organization, and therefore 
there it might be no way to access the component’s code and formally verify its 
behaviour. 
The following list describes the most relevant roles in the system. Roles are 
depicted in bold while their objectives are in italics. Dependencies with other roles 
are also presented and, when relevant, the dependency relation is also introduced.   
 IndustrialOperator: This role is aimed on industrial processes that generate 
economic revenue and, therefore, allow fulfilling the objective of making profit 
(MakeProfit). These industrial processes produce polluted water masses as a 
trade-off of their activity (Produce). Dealing with this wastewater requires the 
collaboration of a IndustrialWWRetainer which stores the wastewater to be 
discharged into the sewer system later on (StoreIndustrialWW). 
 
Fig. 3. Social structure 
 IndustrialWWRetainer: Stores wastewater produced by an 
IndustrialOperator (StoreIndustrialWW) and takes care of it 
(ManageStoredWW) until it is possible to discharge it to the sewer system 
(DischargeIndustrialWW). To perform such discharge it is required the support 
of a IndustrialWWBroker to negotiate the discharge price and assess the 
feasibility of discharging some or all the wastewater, or keep storing it. Besides 
this, it keeps up a registry of all its industrial wastewater discharges performed 
(LogIndustrialWWDischargeCharacteristics), which requires the support of a 
WSensor to analyse the characteristics of discharged wastewater. This 
information can be used by a SewageInspector to verify I  are properly 
managing discharges (VerifyDischarge). 
 IndustrialWWBroker: Negotiates industrial wastewater discharges with a 
WWReceiver to assess how much wastewater is feasible to be discharged 
(AssessAmountOfIndustrialWWDischarge). From the IndustrialWWBroker 
perspective this assessment requires knowing its reserved cost 
(ObtainDischargeReservedCost) (i.e., how much iI  is willing to pay according 
to the discharge price given by the WWReceiver). IndustrialWWBroker is 
consuming treatment capacity to discharge wastewater and comply with the 
policies and norms that regulate wastewater discharges and ensure water quality. 
WWReceiver is offering such service thus the relation is a consumer-provider 
one thus the dependency between both roles in the role dependency diagram is a 
market dependency. 
 WWReceiver: Takes care of negotiating the reception of wastewater masses 
(NegotiateDischarge). This includes providing discharge prices for I  
(CalculateIndustrialWWDischargePrices) and the treatment capacity available 
for industrial wastewater (CalculateIndustrialWWAvailability). To calculate 
discharge prices the WWReceiver uses discharge reference prices provided by 
the CompetentAuthority, the current treatment efficiency in jW  
(ObtainTreatmentEfficiency) as well as the characteristics of the industrial 
wastewater that iI  wants to discharge, which are provided by the 
IndustrialWWRetainer as part of the wastewater discharge negotiation 
process. Concerning treatment capacity availability, it depends on three main 
elements: Wastewater being received from households 
(ObtainHouseholdDemandForecast), meteorological retainers status 
(ObtainMeteoDemandForecast) and current jW  effluent limits imposed by the 
CompetentAuthority. Once influent is received, the WWReceiver determines 
its destination, either to be sent for treatment or bypass it directly to the river. 
This decision depends on (EvaluateInfluentDestination) wastewater 
characteristics (ObtainInfluentCharacteristics), jW  current treatment 
efficiency (ObtainTreatmentEfficiency) and available capacity 
(CalculateAvailableCapacity). Finally, it also keeps a record of the influent 
characteristics received (LogInfluentCharacteristics) for the SewageInspector 
(as part of the VerifyDischarge task) and WWTreater (in order to calculate 
treatment efficiency). 
 WWTreater: Processes the wastewater to reduce its pollutants concentration 
(WWTreatment). Once the treatments ends, treated water is discharged as an 
effluent to the river. This effluent is analyzed (ObtainEffluentCharacteristics) 
and information is logged so the CompetentAuthority can audit it 
(VerifyWWTPEffluent). Given the effluent and influent characteristics 
(ObtainInfluentCharacteristics / ObtainEffluentCharacteristics), WWTreater 
can calculate treatment efficiency (CalculateTreatmentEfficiency). This 
calculation is used to keep W  as efficient as possible 
(AchieveAdequatePerformance). It is also used to support WWReciever during 
discharge price negotiation described before. 
4.2 Interaction Structure 
ALIVE Interaction Structure allows the description of abstract patterns of 
interaction which are the way the roles coordinate their behaviour, managing their 
dependencies while they pursue their individual and collective objectives. The 
interaction structure defines interaction patterns known as scenes (Dignum and 
Dignum 2009) that allow actors to coordinate. The structure defines a set of scenes 
and transitions among them. On every scene one or more role dependencies 
(identified in the previous phase) are managed. 
The structure’s entry point is represented by a circle ( init  label), while the exit 
points are represented by triangles ( end  label). Scenes are represented by 
rectangles and connected by lines (scene transition arcs) that allow the system to 
navigate from scene to scene. Inside every scene, the landmark patterns describe the 
protocol that must be used to achieve the scene result (Dignum and Dignum 2009). 
This diagram will focus on scene transition, allowing the following diagrams to 
focus on the different particular scenes by showing the landmark patterns inside 
them. The entry point leads to the different wastewater generation scenes 
(Household, MeteoWWGenerate and IndustryWWGenerate) and the scenes related 
to water quality protection by the competent authority 
(EnforceWaterQualityPolicies, ComputeWWTPEffluentLimits, 
ComputeIndustryPermissionLimits and ComputeDischargeReferencePrices). 
HouseholdWWGenerate leads directly to wastewater treatment scenes. 
MeteoWWGenerateScene contain particular scenes for discharging the water to W  
(MeteoWWDischarge) or bypassing it (MeteoWWBypass). Industrial production is 
divided in two parts: first wastewater is generated and stored IndustryWWGenerate 
and, later on, a negotiation to discharge wastewater in tank is done 
(IndustryManageWWTank) where a price to discharge is formed 
(WWTPAssessDischargePrice); depending on the negotiation result 
(IndustryAssessWWDischarge) wastewater is discharged (IndustryWWDischarge) 
or it is kept. 
Some discharges will have a discharge verification performed asynchronously 
by the competent authority (VerifyDischarge). Wastewater treatment scenes 
include receiving influent (WWTPReceiveInfluent) and either treating 
(WWTPTreatInfluent) or bypassing it (WWTPBypassfluent)). 
Fig. 4 depicts the internal landmark patterns of the scenes WWTPTreatInfluent 
and WWTPBypassfluent.  
 
  
Fig. 4. Landmark patterns for WWTP influent treatment 
4.3 Social Model 
Up to this point the overall system has been defined in terms of roles, their aims and 
dependencies, without taking into account who will actually enact those roles at 
run-time. The  Social Model defines the way concrete agents enact the organization 
roles, guiding their behaviour and achieving coordinated action by following the 
organizational patterns established for the roles they enact. An agent can enact one 
or several roles, depending on their objectives, and one role can be enacted by more 
than one agent. In the case study, the objectives of UWS infrastructures act as the 
main driving force for allocating roles into agents. 
Fig. 5 shows the model of agents. The central axis is composed by the types of 
agents with a Household, Meteorological, Industrial, WWTP and River Council 
agents (square-shaped). The surrounding nodes represent the roles (round-shaped). 
The arrows connect each role with the agents type that performs it. 
   
Fig. 5. The model of agents describes the roles that each kind of agent can enact during its lifetime. 
5 Agents: Behavior and decision-making 
The most important roles in our system, from an integrated management 
perspective, are two. First, the Competent Authority is responsible for all matters 
relating to the collection, treatment and disposal of wastewater. Second the kW  
which is responsible for treating wastewater in that sector or city. In this section we 
focus on the latter to describe the decisions it has to make to carry out the 
negotiation with industries that would like to discharge the wastewater resulting 
from their activities. The discharge of a wastewater mass requires an agreement 
between a particular and a particular that can accept it for treatment. This process 
requires knowing whether a jW  is capable to properly handle the proposed 
wastewater discharge. 
We define the water characteristics of a water mass kM  as the pair ),( CV , 
where: V  is the volume of water mass given in cubic meters 3m  and, C  is the 
pollutant concentration in the water mass. We also define  rCCC ,,= 1   as the 
set of pollutants concentrations 1  where each iC  corresponds to a specific 
pollutant concentration  ri 1 . In our system, as already explained in Section 
2.1, we consider five different pollutants:  TPTNCODBODTSS ,,,, . Thus 
   TPTNCODBODTSSCCCCCC ,,,,=,,,,= 54321  (Verdaguer et al. 2012). 
                                                          
1 Pollutant concentration is given in (
3m
kg
). 
Given these premises, the negotiation process between iI  and a jW  can be 
described as follows: The jW  checks if it can manage the wastewater that the 
industry wants to discharge (a iW  characterized as  ii CV , ). This means ensuring 
there is enough physical space to receive it (volume availability) and that the plant 
can effectively treat the pollutants contained in the wastewater mass (pollutant 
concentration admissibility); if wastewater contains a high pollutant concentration 
it can harm the treatment process since it depends on bacteria colonies that may 
perish. 
Volume availability ( availableV ) depends on the design volume of the jW  (
capacityV ), the amount of domestic wastewater sent by households ( dV ) and 
meteorological phenomena ( mV )(e.g., rain), whose treatment is mandatory. Finally, 
previously agreed industrial discharges ( scheduledV ) have to be taken into account to 
know what volume capacity remains available for new industrial discharges: 
 scheduledmdcapacityavailable VVVVV =  (1) 
Therefore, if availablei VV   then there is enough space in the jW  to accept the 
wastewater mass. 
To verify pollutant concentration admissibility the process is similar although a 
jW  can admit a higher concentration than the one it can effectively manage; 
however, this will imply a significant higher cost for the industry. Pollutant 
concentration admissibility depends on how much pollutant concentration jW  can 
manage as a parameter design of the plant ( radmissibleC ). Thus, if 
r
i
r
admissible CC   the 
wastewater mass will be accepted without extra cost. Otherwise, the pollutant 
overload will carry an extra cost to the price that industry has to pay. This price is 
calculated by jW  as follows: 
 )(),(=)),,((=),( ijijiiji WWPCWVVCwwtpCVPWWWP   (2) 
Eq. 2 is divided into two parts: a volumetric cost and a pollutant cost. The first 
represents the cost of accepting a certain volume of wastewater generated by iI  
according to the current state of the jW  as well as the taxes defined by the 
competent authority. The second computes the price of processing the wastewater 
discharged by industry iI  according to its pollutant concentration. 
6 Norms 
Scenarios like the one introduced in this Chapter present several actors ( e.g.,  
Industrial Operator, Industrial WWRetainer, WWTreater etc. ) with a variety of 
goals that sometimes are conflicting between them. For instance, the Industrial 
Operator aims at making profit which in turn will generate wastewater, effectively 
polluting the environment. The WWTreater aims at cleaning wastewater for 
protecting the environment at the lowest possible price. Therefore, from the 
individual point of view of an Industrial Operator, the more industrial activity the 
better, even if it results in more polluted water. However, from the individual point 
of view of a WWTreater the less industrial activity the better, as the water will be 
less polluted and therefore will be easier and cheaper to clean. Bringing this 
self-interest to the extreme, the ideal situation for Industrial Operator is a scenario 
with no environmental protection, where the river can be polluted without 
constraints. The ideal situation for WWTreater is a scenario where there are no 
polluting elements (no industries, no households) and therefore the river is never 
polluted. However, the ideal situation from the holistic point of view of the society 
(as a group of interconnected individuals) is to find a balance to protect the 
environment while promoting industrial activity. 
Furthermore, the roles in the scenario depend on each other for achieving their 
goals, and therefore they interact in multiple ways. The combination of these two 
factors results in a society of interacting agents with heterogeneous goals. In order 
to tame the complexity of these interactions, and to align the overall system with a 
common high level goal (e.g., protecting the environment without compromising 
industrial activity) norm-aware electronic distributed systems can be used. 
Electronic specifications of norms are one of the mechanisms being applied to 
define and enforce acceptable behaviour of electronic distributed systems which 
should comply with some (typically human) regulations. One of the options for 
providing norm-aware MAS are Electronic Institutions (EI) (Vázquez-Salceda 
2003). They are models of human institutions with a norm specification provided in 
a machine-readable formalism. The main idea behind EI is capturing the essence of 
an institution (mainly norms and protocols) in a machine processable form. 
Some functionalities in the system depend on the Competent Authority role 
detecting exceptional situations and applying the appropriate restrictions. For 
instance, if a meteorological overflow is notified WWPTs can exceed their 
treatment capacity if they take water from the influent. Therefore plants must limit 
their influent intake until the overflow is solved. It means water from the influent is 
not completely treated and to protect the environment industries can not discharge 
wastewater to the river until the overflow is solved. In order to tackle these 
restrictions we use ALIVE ’s normative structure, grounded on regulative and 
constitutive norms. Such norms specify actor’s obligations (WWTPS must limit 
influent intake until the overflow is solved), prohibitions (discharging water masses 
with high concentrations of mercury) and permissions (industries can not discharge 
wastewater to the river until the overflow is solved). In scenarios like the one 
presented here, MAS are applied to systems with an overall holistic goal and it is 
not desirable that an agent’s autonomous and emergent behaviour diverges from the 
overall goal of the system. In order to limit this agent autonomy and ensure a certain 
coherence between the goals of the particular agents and the overall goals of the 
system, norms can be applied. Furthermore, norms make the behaviour more 
predictable, effectively reducing the complexity of the system. Taking this into 
account, the scenario presented in Section2.1 provides an exciting new line of 
research: modelling and implementing the set of norms that will make the system’s 
objectives ( e.g., have an environmental sustainable system) stand on top of 
individuals’ objectives (e.g., make profit in the case of the industries). Furthermore, 
the set of norms provided is not static, as norms will have to evolve through time 
just as individuals’ behaviour changes to adapt to dynamic circumstances. Not only 
deciding how these norms will have to be adapted is an exciting challenge, but also 
designing mechanisms to support norm dynamics at run-time. Such mechanisms 
effectively support adding, removing or updating norms at run-time and while 
inferring the social state. On the one hand, we can not afford to miss the violation of 
a norm just because we are updating it. On the other hand, we have to infer a social 
state consistent with the changes performed in the norms (e.g., it makes no sense to 
punish an agent for violating a norm that has been removed). 
This section provides examples of norms modelled used the framework 
introduced in (Gómez-Sebastià 2016) and examples on how social and 
technological changes can affect these norms. For each norm a formal model is 
provided, as well as the time line depicting the implications of the norm change. 
Examples for all operations supported by our framework are provided. Norms are 
inspired on European, national and local wastewater treatment directives. 
Our model supports two possible operations (adding and removing norms, 
accounting norm update as a combination of the two basic operations) in two forms 
(retroactively and prospectively). The model also supports regulative norms (with 
obligations, prohibitions and permissions), constitutive norms and institutional 
powers (including both constitutive powers and normative powers). 
6.1 Obligation prospective add: 
The European council directive for Wastewater treatment (European Council 1991) 
in Article 4 and the Catalan plan for Wasterwater treatment inspired on this 
directive (Generalitat de Catalunya 2005) state: 
Member States shall ensure that urban wastewater entering collecting systems shall 
before discharge be subject to secondary treatment or an equivalent treatment as 
follows: 
 at the latest by 31 December 2000 for all discharges from agglomerations of 
more than 15 000 p.e. (population equivalent)  
 at the latest by 31 December 2005 for all discharges from agglomerations of 
between 10 000 and 15 000 p.e.  
It means that, by the date ’01 January 2006’ each WiWWTP  with a p.e. of 
10.000 or more have the obligation to perform a secondary treatment (or a treatment 
that counts-as secondary treatment, that is, an equivalent) before discharging water 
to the river. Failing to comply with the norm will result in the WTTP being 
sanctioned. Fig. 6 shows the formal specification of the regulative norm in our 
model. 
 
Fig. 6. Example of formal norm specification for obligation 
Following the example, the regulative norm is introduced in the system via a 
Prospective Promulgation operation on the date ’01 January 2006’. Therefore, if a 
WiW  with a p.e. of 10.000 or more violated the regulative norm ( i.e. discharged 
water without treating it) before ’01 January 2006’, the act has no legal 
consequences. However, if the plant violates the norm after the promulgation date, 
it will be sanctioned for the act. In the example depicted in Fig. 7, iW  discharges 
untreated water masses 21,MM  before norm promulgation without legal 
consequences. However, discharging untreated water 3M  after promulgation 
results in a sanction being applied. 
 
Fig. 7. Example of timeline for prospective add of a an obligation 
6.2 Obligation prospective remove: 
The European council directive for Wastewater treatment (European Council 1991) 
states in Annex I point D.5:  
Extreme values for the water quality in question shall not be taken into 
consideration when they are the result of unusual situations such as those due to 
heavy rain.  
In our example it stands for the obligation to perform a secondary treatment not 
having effect in unusual situations, such as heavy rain. The obligation has already 
been introduced in Section 6.1 and formally modelled in Fig. 6. However, the model 
does not take into account the fact that the norm is not in place in case of unusual 
situations. One option is to include the exception on the model of the norm ( i.e. 
preventing the norm from activating if water is received by the plant, but an unusual 
situation is in place). Formally, it would imply substituting the activating condition 
of Norm 1N , which is currently ),( ji MWreceived  for 
()),( uationunusualSitMWreceived ji  . However, this solution would result in 
more complex norm formalizations. Furthermore, if new exceptions to the norm are 
added, more conditions would be included in the activating condition, resulting in 
complex and hard to understand norms. A cleaner solution is to allow the competent 
authority (or any other actor with power to alter the norms that govern the system) 
to temporally remove the norm from the system when it is considered appropriate 
(in our example, while the unusual situation takes place). On the one hand, these 
norm could be used to keep norms simple and easy to understand. That is because 
we are leaving the decision of which norms should be active in every scenario to 
higher level (and more expressive) reasoning processes performed by the agents 
responsible of introducing and removing norms in the system. On the other hand, all 
the exceptions to the different norms do not have to be taken into consideration at 
norm design time. They can be introduced later when designing a process that 
decides which norms are active in the system at every point of time. That is, our 
approach allows supporting a normative system which is truly dynamic and adapts 
to changing (and sometimes even not foreseen) situations. 
Following the example depicted in Fig. 8, the norm 1N is removed from the 
system via an Abrogation operation. This allows to effectively implement a general 
exception to the norm while an unusual situation of heavy rain takes place. 
Therefore, if a particular Wastewater Treatment Plant WiW  violated the norm (
i.e.  discharged water without treating it) in a situation of heavy rain, the act has no 
legal consequences. However, if the plant violates the norm outside the unusual 
situation, it will be sanctioned for the act. In this example, a Wastewater Treatment 
Plant iW  discharges untreated water masses 2M  during heavy rain without legal 
consequences. However, discharging untreated water 31,MM  outside the unusual 
situation results in a sanction being applied. Please note that one of the sanctions 
(associated to the discharge of 1M ) is applied during the unusual situation. This is 
because the action causing the norm violation occurred outside the unusual 
situation, and our framework is expressive enough to detect this particular fact. 
 
Fig. 8. Example of timeline for the prospective remove of an obligation 
7 Conclusions and Related work 
Once we have finished introducing our approach of a norm-aware multi-agent 
simulator, we proceed to put it in contrast with similar approaches, focusing on 
detecting confluence points where our work can be complemented by the different 
approaches in the state of the art. Then, we will outline conclusions. 
The work in (Verdaguer et al. 2012) aims at coordinating coordinating industrial 
wastewater discharges between different actors, based on ant colony optimization. 
The system aims at finding the best combination of industrial discharges w.r.t. 
WWTP efficiency, that is, as much capacity as possible is used from the plant 
without overloading it. For doing it, ants are randomly placed on a graph-like search 
space, where nodes are industrial activities and edges possible discharges. The work 
neglects some issues such as the efficiency of a centralized decision system in 
real-world scenarios, or the need to have complete information about industry 
production plans in order to entail expected industrial wastewater discharges. 
Furthermore, the work presented in (Verdaguer et al. 2012) does not take into 
account agents not abiding to the expected patterns of behaviour, and lacks methods 
to deal with such issues. 
The work in (Verdaguer et al. 2012) focuses on the internal reasoning process of 
a coordinator agent (which can be fulfilled by the WWTP agent in our scenario) 
whereas our approach focuses on the structure of the agent society and the 
interactions among agents from an organizational point of view, without detailing 
the internal reasoning processes of the agents. Therefore, we could state both 
approaches are complementary and can benefit from each other. The work in 
(Verdaguer et al. 2012) could benefit from the normative system we propose for 
enforcing acceptable patterns of behaviour (e.g., industries comply with the 
agreements they reach with WWTPs for wastewater treatment) as well as from our 
institutional model to facilitate coordination in complex scenarios where a 
particular agent can fulfil more than one role (e.g., industries with their own WWTP 
that can accept other industry wastewater as long as they are paid enough for 
treating it). 
Market-based approaches are another alternative to coordinate the use of natural 
resources in heteronegous societies of actors. In (Garrido et al. 2013) m Water is 
introduced. m Water is a regulated virtual market simulation where autonomous 
agents trade rights for the use of water in a closed basin. The idea behind  
m Water is allowing policy makers to compare different market configurations 
using market performance indicators. Market configurations contain several 
parameters, including participant population (supporting different behavioural 
templates) and the set of regulations and protocols to be used during the negotiation 
process. Just like our approach, m Water aims at narrowing the gap between water 
management simulations (based on equational descriptions) and social simulations. 
The motivation behind social simulations is to mimic the behaviour of autonomous 
rational individuals and groups of individuals (Smajgl et al. 2009). The main idea is 
modelling not only hydraulic factors (which can be perfectly modelled using 
equational systems) but also social factors, including norm typology and actor’s 
behavioural templates. 
m Water and our proposal have several characteristics in common. Both are 
social simulations grounded on Electronic Institutions able to represent roles, 
coordination scenes, objectives and a normative system. However, when compared 
to our approach m Water presents a more specific and in-depth proposal. m Water 
focuses on negotiation for water use rights, whereas our proposal covers the whole 
river basin management scenario, therefore the negotiation process is not presented 
with such detail. Furthermore, while m Water correctly emphasises the need to 
flexible and dynamic normative systems ( e.g., authors stress the need of 
’organization schemes that are flexible and able to adapt to a changing 
environment with multiple situations’) no method for supporting them is presented. 
Our proposal clearly remarks that this method is available, and we provided an 
exhaustive set of examples based on river basin management. On the one hand, we 
consider our proposal could benefit from the work done in m Water for 
implementing more expressive and powerful auction mechanisms when negotiating 
for wastewater treatment resources. On the other hand, we consider m Water could 
benefit from our proposal to widen the application scenario (limited not only to 
interactions involved on the negotiation for water use rights, but covering the whole 
set of interactions present in river basin management) and support dynamic 
normative systems, able to change the set of norms during the simulations, 
effectively adapting them to new situations and requirements. This would allow to 
simulate not only new sets of policies but also sets of policies evolving through 
time, allowing to evaluate not only the impact of the new set of policies in the 
system, but also the performance of the evolution ( e.g., measuring how long does it 
take for the new policies to be adopted and the performance of the system during the 
transition between different sets of policies). In general we consider evaluating the 
impact on the system of policy evolution, while the simulation keeps running and 
the different actors pursuing their objectives, opens new, more realistic and exciting 
lines of future work w.r.t. simulations for policy optimisation. 
The work presented in (Ernst et al. 2007) presents a social simulator integrated 
with a DSS where a set of heterogeneous agents interacts. We like the idea of 
merging different agent behaviours and perceptions (including environmental, 
social and legal perceptions) via a 5 step reasoning process. However, we consider 
the approach could benefit from a clearly defined social model integrated in the 
reasoning process via socially-aware reasoning methods. Furthermore, it might be 
interesting to integrate protocols and regulations in the reasoning process (e.g., in 
the form of sanctions for agents consuming too much water in drought situations). 
The work presented in (Gailliard et al. 2014) proposes a model for river basin 
governance that includes what is known as a ‘boundary worker’. Boundary 
workers, such as river basin managers, are interfaces aimed at facilitating an 
evolution towards more sustainable practices in river-basin governance. The main 
aim of (Gailliard et al. 2014) is to analyze the impact of boundary workers on the 
behaviour of heterogeneous actors interacting on a common social-hydrosystem. 
This is achieved by creating an agent-based model including qualititative data 
(research questions, expected rules of behaviour, interactions between agents and 
some scenarios to simulate) which can be reviewed via a return field in order to 
calibrate the model as finely as possible. In contrast to (Gailliard et al. 2014) our 
approach supports governance either via a pre-defined set of rules (e.g., provided by 
a river basin manager) or via a consensual agreement between the different actors 
involved in the scenario. In any case, this set of rules will not be static, but will 
evolve through time as new regulations and behaviours emerge in the society of 
actors involved in river basin management. 
To conclude, this chapter has presented a norm-aware agent-based model for 
integrated wastewater management systems. The chapter provides an example on 
how normative systems can be integrated in multi-agent systems where actors’ 
objectives are heterogeneous and sometimes conflicting. The normative system 
allows to align agent’s objectives with common organisational objectives. At the 
same time, it allows to detect undesirable patterns of behaviour in the agents, such 
as free raiders. Thanks to our proposal, misbehaving actors can be sanctioned, 
effectively enforcing good practices among the actors. 
In this aspect, our proposal shows many features in common with several works 
in the state of the art. However, our proposal goes beyond, as it allows the set of 
norms governing the multi-agent system to evolve through time. We provide a wide 
range of examples, where regulative norms in the form of obligations, prohibitions 
and permissions are inserted, removed and updated. Furthermore, we also show 
examples of dynamic operations on constitutive norms and constitutive powers. 
While most of the systems analysed show a less expressive normative language 
(they typically do not account for constitutive norms and constitutive powers) we 
provide a rich set of normative elements (Alvarez-Napagao 2016), supporting 
deontic elements (obligations, prohibitions and permissions), constitutive norms, 
constitutive powers and violation handling norms (i.e. sanctions). Furthermore, our 
normative elements contain a rich structure with activation, maintenance and 
deactivation conditions, as well as deadlines. 
Finally, we support norm dynamics, which is not supported by the proposals 
analysed in the state of the art. We propose four operations to update the normative 
system accounting for norm promulgation and derogation both in prospective and 
retroactive forms. On the one hand, we combine norm operations with a rich set of 
normative elements providing a dynamic normative language that can be adapted to 
a numerous set of contexts and situations. This is specially important in wastewater 
management scenarios, where the set of norms will evolve adapting to situations 
which are typically out of control of managers and legislators (e.g., heavy rains, 
droughts, pollution of the environment). On the other hand we can adapt norms 
while our system is on-line, inferring a normative state consistent with the update. 
In scenarios like wastewater management we can not afford to stop observing the 
social reality, as free raiders and other misbehaving actors could take advantage of 
this situation. 
In contrast, our proposal does not present complex reasoning processes and 
decision taking mechanisms for the agents involved in the system. We focus on the 
normative system, so we can effectively benefit from more expressive and complex 
agents the other proposals include. As a future research direction we plan to 
integrate a norm reasoning process into our simulator. This will allow the agents to 
decide which norms should be changed and how. Our hypothesis is agents can adapt 
norms to the scenario in order to regulate the ussage of natural resources. The 
objective is to avoid or delay the tragedy of the commons from ocurring. 
As a summary, in this chapter we have seen a wide range of norms and norm 
operations, based in real world regulations and protocols, such as (European 
Council 1991). This chapter focuses on how the normative system can evolve. On 
the one hand adapting itself to new regulations and protocols caused by 
technological advances or social changes. On the other hand, adapting itself to 
unexpected situations which are typically out of control of managers and 
legislators, such as heavy rains. Furthermore the work presented in this chapter is 
being integrated into a social simulation system that models the Besòs river basin. 
In such simulation agents participate in a Tragedy of the Commons scenario where 
water quality represents the common good. Agents face the dilemma of breaking 
the rules to increase their utility functions or act legally according to current state of 
norms. Including normative dynamics allows us to adapt norms to environmental 
changes and see if those changes allow the common good to be preserved despite 
agents’ behaviours and selfish interests that drives them to, under certain 
circumstances, act as free riders. 
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